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Abstract
The idea of reserve against brain damage stems from the repeated observation that there does not appear to be a
direct relationship between the degree of brain pathology or brain damage and the clinical manifestation of that
damage. This paper attempts to develop a coherent theoretical account of reserve. One convenient subdivision of
reserve models revolves around whether they envision reserve as a passive process, such as in brain reserve or
threshold, or see the brain as actively attempting to cope with or compensate for pathology, as in cognitive reserve.
Cognitive reserve may be based on more efficient utilization of brain networks or of enhanced ability to recruit
alternate brain networks as needed. A distinction is suggested between reserve, the ability to optimize or maximize
normal performance, and compensation, an attempt to maximize performance in the face of brain damage by using
brain structures or networks not engaged when the brain is not damaged. Epidemiologic and imaging data that help
to develop and support the concept of reserve are presented. (JINS, 2002, 8, 448– 460.)
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INTRODUCTION
The idea of reserve against brain damage stems from the
repeated observation that there does not appear to be a di-
rect relationship between the degree of brain pathology or
brain damage and the clinical manifestation of that damage.
For example, Katzman et al. (1989) described 10 cases of
cognitively normal elders who were discovered to have ad-
vanced Alzheimer’s disease (AD) pathology in their brains
at death. They speculated these women did not express the
clinical features of AD because their brains were larger
than average. Similarly, most clinicians are aware of the
fact that a stroke of a given magnitude can produce pro-
found impairment in one patient and while having minimal
effect on another. Something must account for the disjunc-
tion between the degree of brain damage and its outcome,
and the concept of reserve has been proposed to serve this
purpose.
There have been many attempts to produce a coherent
theoretical account of reserve. This paper will attempt to
review and synthesize concepts that have been suggested,
such as threshold, compensation, neuronal or brain reserve,
and cognitive reserve. Many of these terms have been used
interchangeably by previous authors, and they have not had
well-accepted definitions. Specific definitions will be of-
fered for these concepts that attempt to capture potential
theoretical distinctions between them.
The concept of reserve should be relevant to any situa-
tion where the brain sustains injury. In addition, it will be
argued that the concept of reserve should be extended to
encompass variation in healthy individuals’ performance,
particularly when they must perform at their maximum ca-
pacity. Nevertheless, many of the concrete examples will
be framed around AD, with the implicit assumption that the
discussion has implications for brain damage in general.
AD has some unique advantages for examining disease-
induced changes in brain function. AD pathology affects
cortical circuitry that subserves a wide range of cognitive
functions, and its pathology is more likely than conditions
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such as stroke to affect similar anatomic sites across sub-
jects, allowing better generalization. AD is also slowly but
inexorably progressive, providing a more sensitive indica-
tor of the severity of brain insult required before cognitive
networks change. On the other hand, the potential for ad-
aptation of recovery might vary between slowly progres-
sive and acute pathologies, so studies of AD may not always
have direct implications for studies of other conditions.
Finally, it should be noted that this paper is not intended
to be a comprehensive review of all of the literature rele-
vant to the concept of reserve. For example, there is a large
body of work investigating the concept of reserve in the
context of HIV-related cognitive functioning that will not
be addressed here (Basso & Bornstein, 2000; Pereda et al.,
2000; Satz et al., 1993; Starace et al., 1998; Stern et al.,
1996). Rather, work has been selected that helps to develop
and support the ideas that will be presented.
DEFINING RESERVE
One convenient, although not entirely accurate, subdivision
of reserve models revolves around whether they envision
reserve as a passive process, or see the brain as actively
attempting to cope with or compensate for pathology. In
passive models, reserve is defined in terms of the amount of
damage that can be sustained before reaching a threshold
for clinical expression. In the active models, reserve re-
volves around differences in how the task is processed. These
two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Ultimately, some
combination of these two approaches might best describe
the empirical observations that have prompted us to de-
velop the concept of reserve.
Passive Models: Brain Reserve or Threshold
Many investigators have proposed passive models includ-
ing Katzman (1993; brain reserve) and Mortimer et al. (1981;
neuronal reserve). This type of model has also long been
implicitly adopted by most clinicians. The threshold model,
critically reviewed by Satz (1993), is one of the best artic-
ulated passive models. The threshold model revolves around
the construct of brain reserve capacity (BRC). While BRC
is a hypothetical construct, concrete examples of BRC might
include brain size or synapse count. The model recognizes
that there are individual differences in BRC. It also presup-
poses that there is a critical threshold of BRC. Once BRC is
depleted past this threshold, specific clinical or functional
deficits emerge.
This formulation, illustrated in Figure 1 (derived from
Satz, 1993b), is sufficient to account for many clinical ob-
servations. Assume that two patients have two different
amounts of BRC. A lesion of a particular size might result
in a clinical deficit in a person with less BRC (Patient 2),
because it exceeds the threshold of brain damage sufficient
to produce that deficit. However, an individual with greater
BRC (Patient 1) could remain unaffected, because this
threshold is not exceeded. Thus, more BRC can be consid-
ered protective factor, while less BRC would impart vul-
nerability. An apparently intact individual with pre-existing
brain damage can tolerate less new brain damage than an-
other individual without this underlying pathology: the pre-
existing damage reduces the amount of remaining BRC, so
the new lesion is sufficient to exceed the functional impair-
ment cutoff.
Many observations about the prevalence and incidence
of AD are consistent with the threshold model. Figure 2
(based on Katzman, 1993) illustrates that the progression of
AD pathology and the clinical expression of AD can be
discontinuous. AD pathology probably begins to develop
many years before the disease is expressed clinically and
Fig. 1. The threshold or brain reserve model. In 2 patients with
different amounts of brain reserve capacity (BRC), a lesion of a
particular size results in a clinical deficit in a person with less
BRC (Patient 2), because it exceeds the threshold of brain damage
sufficient to produce that deficit. However, an individual with
greater BRC could remain unaffected.
Fig. 2. AD pathology probably begins to develop many years be-
fore the disease is expressed clinically and slowly becomes more
severe. At some point symptoms of sufficient severity allow the
diagnosis of AD. The arrows surrounding the point in the figure
where clinical symptoms appear denote the fact that there are
individual differences in reserve capacity, and these differences
result in later or earlier expression of clinical symptoms.
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slowly becomes more severe. The threshold model would
assume that when synapses are depleted beyond some crit-
ical point1 the initial symptoms of dementia will appear. At
some point after this, depletion will result in symptoms of
sufficient severity to allow the diagnosis of AD. The arrows
surrounding the point in the figure where clinical symp-
toms appear denote the fact that there are individual differ-
ences in reserve capacity, and these differences result in
later or earlier expression of clinical symptoms. In patients
with more reserve, synapse loss must be more severe before
clinical symptoms appear and the symptoms appear later.
Conversely, symptoms would appear earlier in a patient
with less reserve.
The threshold approach can be extended to account for
more than just differences in the onset of a clinical out-
come. Because reserve mediates between the pathology and
its clinical outcome, the level of reserve should also influ-
ence the severity of clinical symptoms after the threshold
for their appearance has occurred. This is demonstrated sche-
matically in Figure 3 with regard to AD. Almost all patients
in this scheme are demented, except those with mild pathol-
ogy and high levels of reserve. Two levels of pathologic
severity are illustrated. Within any level, patients with more
reserve show less severe clinical signs of AD as assessed by
global measures such as mental status tests or by more fo-
cused measures such as memory tests. Still, at any level of
reserve, more severe pathology results in more severe clin-
ical deficits.
Some research that supports the threshold or brain re-
serve model in AD will be reviewed below. To give one
concrete example, several studies have found that individ-
uals with larger brain size or head circumference have less
severe AD or are less likely to develop AD (Graves et al.,
1996; Schofield et al., 1997), or are more likely to have less
severe AD. Ostensibly, individuals with larger brain size
would have more synapses to lose before the critical thresh-
old for AD is reached.
There are several reasons why threshold or brain reserve
models can be termed passive models of reserve. First, this
type of model assumes that there is some fixed cut-off or
threshold at which functional impairment will occur for
everyone. In the case of AD, this threshold might be deple-
tion of synapses to the point where only a specific number
remain. Second, threshold models are essentially quantita-
tive models. They assume that a specific type of brain dam-
age will have the same effect in each person, and that
repeated instances of brain damage sum together. Individ-
uals differ only in their overall brain capacity, and brain
damage is either sufficient or insufficient to deplete BRC to
some critical level. The model does not account for individ-
ual differences in how the brain processes cognitive or func-
tional tasks in the face of the disruption caused by brain
damage. It also does not address potential qualitative dif-
ferences between different types of brain damage.
These observations do not negate the importance of the
threshold model. They just suggest that this model alone is
probably not sufficient to explain all features of reserve and
that extensions of the threshold model need to be considered.
Active Models
The active models of reserve suggest that the brain actively
attempts to compensate for brain damage. I suggest that in
its active form, there can be at least two types of reserve.
The first is cognitive reserve. This could take the form of
using brain networks or cognitive paradigms that are less
susceptible to disruption. I propose that this type of reserve
is a normal process used by healthy individuals when cop-
ing with task demands. The second is compensation: using
brain structures or networks not normally used by individ-
uals with intact brains in order to compensate for brain
damage.
Cognitive reserve
Cognitive reserve parallels the concept of brain reserve in
that it is a potential mechanism for coping with brain dam-
age. In the threshold model, the reserve capacity typically
consists of additional synapses or an increased number of
redundant neuronal networks. Cognitive reserve focuses
more on the “software.” This could consist of the ability of
the cognitive paradigm underlying a task to sustain disrup-
tion and still operate effectively. Alternately, this could con-
sist of the ability to use alternate paradigms to approach a
problem when the more standard approach is no longer
operational.
The concept of cognitive reserve provides a ready expla-
nation for why many studies have demonstrated that higher
1For the purposes of discussion, we can treat the advancing AD
pathology as loss of synapses. Loss of synapses is the facet of AD pathol-
ogy that has been most reliably linked to cognitive change and disease
severity (DeKosky & Scheff, 1990; Terry et al., 1991).
Fig. 3. Because reserve mediates between the pathology and its
clinical outcome, the level of reserve should also influence the
severity of clinical symptoms after the threshold for their appear-
ance has occurred. Here, at any level of disease pathology, pa-
tients with more reserve evidence more mild levels of clinical
severity
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levels of intelligence, and of educational and occupational
attainment are good predictors of which individuals can
sustain greater brain damage before demonstrating func-
tional deficit. Rather than positing that these individuals’
brains are grossly anatomically different than those with
less reserve (e.g., they have more synapses), the cognitive
reserve hypothesis posits that they process tasks in a more
efficient manner.
The concept of cognitive reserve also differs from the
passive threshold approach in other important ways. Recall
that in the passive model, individuals may have different
levels of BRC and a lesion of the same size is sufficient to
deplete BRC below the critical threshold in some individ-
uals but not others (see Figure 1). The cognitive reserve
model is illustrated in Figure 4. Here the 2 patients have the
same amount of BRC (again, let’s say, the same number of
synapses). However, Patient 1 has more cognitive reserve
than Patient 2, in that Patient 1 uses more efficient process-
ing mechanisms. As a result, Patient 1 can tolerate a larger
lesion than Patient 2 before functional impairment is appar-
ent. Thus, the cognitive reserve model does not assume that
there is some fixed cut-off or threshold at which functional
impairment will occur. The critical threshold differs from
one person to the next, depending on how efficient or resil-
ient the “software” is in using the remaining neural sub-
strate. Putting it another way, the threshold approach
supposes that the person with more BRC has more to lose
before they reach some clinical cut-point. The cognitive
reserve hypothesis focuses less on what is lost and more on
what is left. In the case of AD, one individual may begin to
express clinical features when synapses are depleted to a
particular number, while an individual with more cognitive
reserve may be able to operate effectively with the same
number of synapses.
From a strict point of view, the differences in cognitive
processing envisioned by the cognitive reserve model must
also have a physiologic basis, in that the brain must ulti-
mately mediate all cognitive function. The difference is in
terms of the level of analysis. Presumably, the physiologic
variability subsumed by cognitive reserve is at the level of
variability in synaptic organization, or in relative utiliza-
tion of specific brain regions. Thus cognitive reserve im-
plies anatomic variability at the level of brain networks,
while brain reserve implies differences in the quantity of
available neural substrate.
The cognitive reserve model also does not assume that a
specific type of brain damage will have the same effect in
each person. Because of individual variability in how they
cope with brain damage, the same amount of damage will
have different effects on different people, even if BRC is
held constant.
A proposed definition of cognitive reserve is: the ability
to optimize or maximize performance through differential
recruitment of brain networks, which perhaps reflect the
use of alternate cognitive strategies. Since the changes in
brain recruitment associated with reserve are a normal re-
sponse to increased task demands, this definition suggests
that cognitive reserve is present in both healthy individuals
and those with brain damage, and is reflected in the modu-
lation of the same brain networks. In essence, an individual
who uses a brain network more efficiently, or is more ca-
pable of calling up alternate brain networks or cognitive
strategies in response to increased demand may have more
cognitive reserve. The definition encompasses two possi-
bilities, differences in recruitment of the same network, and
differential ability to recruit alternate networks. These pos-
sibilities will be discussed in turn. This discussion is ex-
tremely speculative, although some evidence to support these
speculative lines will be reviewed.
More efficient use of brain networks
This idea is based on studies of how normal individuals
respond as tasks are made increasingly difficult and of in-
dividual differences in task performance. The rough paral-
lel here is that, in effect, brain damage acts to increase task
difficulty. Several functional imaging studies suggest that a
common response to increasing task difficulty in normal
individuals is increased activation of areas involved in an
easier version of the task and0or the recruitment of addi-
tional brain areas (Grady et al., 1996; Grasby et al., 1994;
Gur et al., 1988; Rypma et al., 1999). There are also indi-
vidual differences in how this additional recruitment oc-
curs. For any level of task difficulty, more skilled individuals
typically show less task-related recruitment than less skilled
individuals. When the more skilled individual exerts her-
self maximally, she can perform better than the less skilled
one. This increased efficiency and larger dynamic range
can be considered reserve. If brain damage is considered a
form of demand (similar to increased task difficulty), then a
person with more cognitive reserve would be able to cope
with more brain damage and still maintain effective func-
tioning. Often, increased task difficulty results in the re-
cruitment of additional brain areas or networks. We might
Fig. 4. The cognitive reserve model. Two patients have the same
amount of brain reserve. However, Patient 1 has more cognitive
reserve than Patient 2, in that Patient 1 uses more efficient pro-
cessing mechanisms. As a result, Patient 1 can tolerate a larger
lesion than Patient 2 before functional impairment is apparent.
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speculate that, in a person with more reserve, this addi-
tional recruitment would occur at a higher difficulty level.
Differential ability to recruit
alternate networks
This possibility is more speculative, but is consistent with
the concept of cognitive reserve. The point is simply that a
person with more reserve might be able to call on a larger
array of alternate networks for solving the problem at hand.
As a concrete example, a trained mathematician might be
able to solve a mathematics problem many different ways,
while a less experienced individual might have only one
possible solution strategy available. The mathematician
would have more flexibility in solving the problem if any
particular solution strategy was precluded. This built in re-
dundancy would permit greater resilience in the face of
brain damage.
These two ideas about reserve might form a heuristic
framework for designing studies about cognitive reserve.
Studies can be aimed at behavior in unimpaired individu-
als, taking advantage of inherent inter-individual differ-
ences in skills or intelligence. Predictions can then be made
about how these individual differences might affect re-
sponse to brain damage.
Compensation
The term cognitive reserve can be limited to the variability
seen in non-brain damaged individuals, which distin-
guishes it from compensation, which might be reserved
for a specific response to brain damage. This distinction
emerges from the consideration of findings in functional
imaging studies that compared task-related activation in
impaired and unimpaired groups with a more critical eye.
For example, several functional neuroimaging studies com-
paring task-related activation in AD patients and controls
found more marked and extensive activation in the pa-
tients (Becker et al., 1996; Deutsch et al., 1993; Grady
et al., 1993). These findings have been interpreted as evi-
dence that the patients compensated for AD pathology.
That is, since pathology impaired the patients’ ability to
mediate the task through the same brain network used by
the controls, the patients compensated by engaging alter-
nate brain areas during task performance. One may ask
whether this observed “compensation,” as the investiga-
tors called it, is the same thing as cognitive reserve. If
compensation truly represents a change that is induced by
brain damage, then it might be important to distinguish
between compensation and cognitive reserve. This distinc-
tion has not been commonly used in the reserve literature.
However, recent functional imaging studies are often care-
fully designed to ensure that observed group differences
are not simply a function of task difficulty.
Compensation is thus first defined in the negative, in that
it cannot be simply a normal response to difficulty. In ad-
dition, the term compensation implies an attempt to maxi-
mize performance in the face of brain damage by using
brain structures or networks not engaged when the brain is
not damaged.
One of the theoretical reasons why discriminating be-
tween reserve and compensation might be important is that
it helps critically evaluate the results of studies comparing
impaired and unimpaired populations. For example, one
study (Becker et al., 1996) reported a comparison of PET
rCBF in AD patients and elderly controls performing a ver-
bal list-learning task. Three list-lengths, of one, three, and
eight were used. In the eight-word task (compared to the
three-word task), patients showed decreased activation of
the lateral frontal cortex relative to controls. However, dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex and areas surrounding the angu-
lar gyrus were more active than in the controls. The authors
suggested that this may represent a response to neuropath-
ologic changes that is specific to AD patients. In the pro-
posed classification scheme, this would be considered
compensation. Later, using another analytic technique, the
same authors concluded that both patients and controls used
the same underlying network to mediate the memory task
(Herbster et al., 1996). They reported that observed group
differences they originally reported were a result of differ-
ential activation of this network, probably because the task
was more difficult for the AD patients. In the proposed
classification scheme, this would be considered cognitive
reserve. In assessing the brain’s response to damage, it clearly
will be important to know which responses are within the
range of normal behavior and which only occur in the pres-
ence of pathology.
Disentangling compensation and reserve presents a spe-
cific experimental design problem. Studies must use tasks
that allow for systematic manipulation of task difficulty.
Ideally, task difficulty should be equated across individu-
als, not just subject groups. Once task difficulty is equated,
group differences in patterns and levels of functional acti-
vation are more likely to represent compensation, and not
reserve.
Stern et al. (2000) tried to determine whether the pathol-
ogy of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) alters the brain networks
subserving performance on a memory task, while carefully
controlling for task difficulty. H2[15O] PET was used to
measure regional cerebral blood flow in patients and healthy
elders during the performance of a verbal recognition task.
Task difficulty was matched across participants by adjust-
ing the size of the list that each subject had to remember
such that each subject’s recognition accuracy was 75%. In
the healthy elders, a network of brain areas involving left
anterior cingulate, anterior insula, and left basal ganglia
was activated during task performance. Higher study list
size (SLS) was associated with increased recruitment of
this network, indicating that this network was associated
with task performance and that subjects who could recruit
the network to a greater degree could perform the task bet-
ter. Only 3 AD patients also expressed this network in a
similar manner. This network used by the controls and a
minority of AD patients may mediate reserve, in that it
452 Y. Stern
appears to be recruited to cope with the demands presented
by the activation task, and differential recruitment of the
network is directly related to the ability to perform the task.
Individuals who are able to activate this network to a greater
degree may have more reserve against brain damage.
The remaining 11 AD patients recruited a different net-
work during task performance, consisting of left posterior
temporal cortex, calcarine cortex, posterior cingulate, and
the vermis. Again, in these patients, higher SLS was asso-
ciated with increased activation of this network. Thus the
majority of AD patients did not use the same network as
controls to mediate task performance, but rather used an
alternate network. The healthy elders also expressed this
network during task performance, but it did not mediate
their performance of the task, as indicated by the lack of
correlation between their expression of this network and
their SLS.
Whether the patients’ use of the alternate network repre-
sents compensation is a matter of definition. The alternate
network was used by patients in the place of the normal
network in an attempt to mediate task demands, suggesting
that its use was compensatory. However, this network was
also activated by the healthy elders, indicating that it was
not unique to the patients. If the term compensation is re-
served for the use of a novel network that emerges in re-
sponse to pathology, then the alternate network does not
meet this criterion. On the other hand, the role played by
the alternate network differed in patients and controls, in
that it appeared to be mediating the ability to achieve larger
study list sizes in the patients but not the healthy elders.
This novel use of the network may arise out of the inability
to use the standard network, and thus may be considered
compensation. Studies such as this one may lead to better
understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying compen-
sation and reserve.
Similar considerations of compensation and reserve ap-
ply when examining other issues, such as recovery from
stroke. Some aspects of recovery simply rely on resolution
of factors such as edema. More interesting from our per-
spective is recovery of function that results from alterations
in the brain networks that underlie specific behavior. Thus
it is important to demonstrate that the patient is really using
a novel brain network, as opposed to a degraded version of
the “normal” network.
RESEARCH APPROACHES TO RESERVE
Research investigating reserve must focus on three compo-
nents: brain damage, clinical expression of the brain dam-
age, and the theoretical mediation of reserve. Of course, the
key question to be answered is what actually mediates the
relationship between brain damage and its clinical out-
come. Most typically, study designs attempt to establish
some operational definition for at least two of the three
components. By measuring these two components they at-
tempt to make inferences about the third. This theme will
be developed further in the discussion below, which re-
views some operational definitions that have been used for
each component of the model, and describes some repre-
sentative studies that have used these definitions.
Indices of Pathology
The problem of assessing the nature and degree of brain
damage is a familiar one in neuropsychological studies. The
optimal measure of brain damage would be some anatomic
index of that damage. In some cases, these indices can be
relatively direct, even without resorting to post mortem stud-
ies. In stroke, for example, direct measures of the volume
of stroke, in combination with some consideration of their
location, might be useful. Most often, we must resort to
proxy measures of pathology. In studies of head trauma, for
example, we have no direct measure of neuronal damage,
but clinical indices have been established that appear to
capture that severity to some degree. These include mea-
sures of the severity of the head trauma itself or measures
of its sequela, including the duration of loss of conscious-
ness. In AD, there is no existing direct measure of patho-
logic severity. In addition, we run a danger of confusing
measures of outcome with measures of pathologic severity;
because they are outcomes, clinical measures of disease
severity, such as mental status or activities of daily living
scales cannot be used to estimate the pathologic burden. An
optimal approach to this problem is clinicopathologic stud-
ies, where postmortem indices of pathology, such as syn-
apse loss, or amyloid burden, are related to aspects of the
clinical presentation observed during life. Several studies
of reserve have used this challenging approach. In particu-
lar, Snowdon et al. have demonstrated a relation between
measures of linguistic ability acquired at an early age, and
the presence of AD pathology noted post mortem (Snow-
don et al., 1996).
An alternate approach is to develop a proxy measure for
pathology that can be used during life. Some studies of AD
have used the characteristic reduction in parietotemporal
and frontal perfusion and metabolism seen at rest in AD
(Prohovnik et al., 1988) as an index of the severity of AD
pathology. The perfusion deficit correlates with disease se-
verity and increases with disease progression (Foster et al.,
1984) and its distribution overlaps with the cortical areas
with the greatest density of histopathological abnormalities
(Brun & Englund, 1981; Pearson et al., 1985; Rogers &
Morrison, 1985). Because this perfusion pattern is not unique
to AD (Schapiro et al., 1993), the degree of CBF deficit
might be used as a marker of the severity of AD pathology,
but not necessarily as a diagnostic indicator.
One functional imaging study found that, in patients
matched for overall severity of dementia, the parietotempo-
ral flow deficit was greater in those with more years of
education (Stern et al., 1992). This observation was con-
firmed in a later PET study (Alexander et al., 1997). After
controlling for clinical dementia severity, higher education
was correlated with reduced cerebral metabolism in prefron-
tal, premotor, and left superior parietal association areas.
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These studies support the idea that although pathology was
more advanced in patients with higher education, the clin-
ical manifestations of the disease were comparable to those
in patients with lower education and less pathology. Pre-
sumably the patients with more education had more cogni-
tive reserve.
Because of the general difficulty in ascertaining or quan-
tifying pathology, many research designs do not attempt to
do so. In general, if a research design specifies two of the
three components, the third can be inferred. Thus often stud-
ies measure clinical outcomes while specifying some index
of reserve, and then attempt to make inferences about under-
lying pathology. One such study (Stern et al., 1995a) matched
AD patients for clinical severity and followed them prospec-
tively.AD patients with greater education or occupational at-
tainment died sooner than those with less attainment. Here,
the proxy for reserve is the level of educational and occupa-
tional attainment. The outcome is death, which is more likely
when AD pathology is more advanced. The observed rela-
tion between the level of reserve and mortality implies that
at any level of assessed clinical severity, the underlying pa-
thology of AD is more advanced in patients with more edu-
cational or occupational attainment. This would result in
shorter duration of diagnosed disease before death. A recent
study did not replicate this finding (Geerlings et al., 1997),
but a follow-up study by the same group, using patients with
more advanced dementia, did (Geerlings et al., 1999).
Outcome Measures
One of the key outcomes in the study of reserve is the
presence or absence of some clinical entity. For example in
AD, many studies have attempted to determine whether
there is a relation between some measure of reserve, such
as education, and the prevalence or incidence of AD. Many
studies have observed higher prevalence of AD in individ-
uals with lower education (Bonaiuto et al., 1990; Callahan
et al., 1996; The Canadian Study of Health and Aging, 1994;
Glatt et al., 1996; Gurland et al., 1995; Hill et al., 1993;
Korczyn et al., 1991; Mortel et al., 1995; Ott et al., 1995;
Prencipe et al., 1996; Sulkava et al., 1985; Zhang et al.,
1990). Note that the assumption here is that since education
is associated with reserve against the expression of AD pa-
thology, AD should be less prevalent in individuals with
higher education. These studies do not directly measure AD
pathology, and assume that its prevalence is relatively equal
across education groups.
A major weakness of prevalence studies for the study of
reserve is the potential confounding of the determination of
the outcome with the measure of reserve. For example, the
diagnosis of dementia relies on the presence of cognitive
deficit. Individuals with lower educational attainment may
simply perform worse on the psychometric tests used to
identify these deficits, while those with higher education
perform better. It is possible to eliminate some of this di-
agnostic bias with incidence studies, where the outcome is
the new diagnosis of dementia in a previously non-demented
individual. If all subjects originally have the same diagnos-
tic evaluation and are judged to be nondemented, the diag-
nosis of incident dementia at followup necessarily implies
major decline from initial performance. This minimizes the
chance of misdiagnosing a nondemented individual who
could never have passed the diagnostic tests. Several groups
have reported that the relative risk of incident dementia
was increased in subjects with low education (Evans et al.,
1993; Letenneur et al., 1994; Stern et al., 1994; White et al.,
1994). Other prevalence (Beard et al., 1992; Fratiglioni
et al., 1991) and incidence (Cobb et al., 1995) studies have
not found an education effect for AD. Between-study dif-
ferences are probably a function of differences in study
samples. For example, in contrast to studies with positive
findings, the Cobb et al. (1995) study had only a small
percentage of subjects who did not complete grade school
(8.1%), perhaps limiting power to observe an educational
effect. Also, lower educational attainment was strongly con-
founded with increased age in that study.
The incidence studies suggest that higher prevalence of
dementia in the low education0occupation group is not sim-
ply a result of detection bias, because all subjects pass the
screens and are rated as nondemented at least once. Still the
possibility of bias exists even in incidence studies. It may
have been more difficult to detect new dementia in the high
education and occupation groups because of lowered sen-
sitivity of neuropsychological tests in these groups. The
Stern et al. (1994) study tried two approaches to address
this issue. First, subjects with “questionable dementia” were
eliminated from analyses. This ensured a substantial change
in performance for the diagnosis of dementia. They also
evaluated the validity of the dementia diagnoses by inves-
tigating functional decline. Functional scores in the newly
demented patients from both high and low education groups
declined significantly from baseline values, while those in
the nondemented groups remained stable. To the extent that
the diagnosis of dementia corresponds to changes in perfor-
mance that disrupt daily activities, the possibility of detec-
tion bias is minimized.
The epidemiologic studies above used a dichotomous out-
come, the presence or absence of AD. Neuropsychologists
excel in developing and applying measures that ascertain
the effects of brain damage. Standard measures of cogni-
tion, both global and specific can be used as outcome mea-
sures in the study of reserve. A great advantage of continuous
outcome measures is that they provide more statistical power
than dichotomous variables.
The value of a continuous outcome measure is demon-
strated by a study in which AD patients were matched for
clinical severity and performance on a memory test (Stern
et al., 1999). Patients with higher educational and occupa-
tional attainment showed more rapid decline in their mem-
ory functioning. A similar relationship between educational
attainment and rate of decline in memory scores was also
noted in another study (Teri et al., 1995). A cognitive-reserve-
based explanation for these findings would be that, because
patients with higher educational and occupational attain-
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ment have more cognitive reserve, more pathology is re-
quired before memory begins to be affected. However, AD
pathology progresses independently of educational and oc-
cupational attainment, and when pathology becomes very
severe there is no longer a substrate for cognitive reserve to
come into play. Thus, the severity of AD pathology at the
initiation of memory deficit varies as a function of reserve,
but the level of pathology associated with severe clinical
dysfunction does not vary as a function of reserve. The
result is a shorter time between the initiation of memory
loss and severe memory disability in patients with higher
educational and occupational attainment. Note that this in-
terpretation relies on the assumption that AD pathology pro-
gresses independently of reserve. Thus, differential rates of
clinical progression can provide insight into how reserve
may mediate the relation between pathology and outcome.
This approach does not rely a direct measure of pathology
but rather on the progressive nature of the pathology.
In contrast to the findings in AD, several studies of nor-
mal aging have found more rapid cognitive decline in indi-
viduals with lower educational attainment (Albert et al.,
1995; Butler et al., 1996; Farmer et al., 1995). Similarly,
lower education has been associated with greater risk of
functional decline in nondemented individuals (Snowdon
et al., 1989). These findings, in healthy individuals, suggest
that reserve is allowing them to cope more successfully
with age-related changes.
It is also important to consider noncognitive outcomes
that may be mediated by reserve. Among these are changes
in day-to-day function, which are assessed by measures of
basic and instrumental activities of daily living as well by
other indices of function such as vocational measures. In
addition, it is important to consider whether reserve may
mediate the affective consequences of brain damage, such
as depression. One epidemiologic study of AD is instruc-
tive in this regard (Geerlings et al., 2000). The authors found
a reduced incidence of AD in individuals with higher versus
lower educational attainment. However, the presence of de-
pression was predictive of incident dementia only in the
higher education group. They reasoned that cognitive re-
serve allowed individuals with more education to cope with
AD pathology longer, thus delaying the cognitive symp-
toms of AD. However, the reserve was not successful in
coping with another outcome of AD pathology, depression.
Thus individuals with higher education were more likely to
manifest an early depression as an early sign of the disease.
Measures of Reserve
The selection of research measures to represent reserve is
dependent on the investigator’s theoretical concept of what
reserve is. When selecting a proxy for reserve, one must
keep in mind that its true mode of action may not be in
accord with the theoretical reason for its selection.
For advocates of the idea of brain reserve, anatomic mea-
sures such as brain size, head circumference, synaptic count,
or dendritic branching are effective measures of reserve.
A direct test of the brain reserve hypothesis is to deter-
mine whether larger head or brain size is associated with
reduced prevalence, risk, or severity of dementia. Several
studies have showed such a relationship (Aksari & Stoppe,
1996; Graves et al., 1996; Mori et al., 1997; Schofield
et al., 1997). Schofield et al. (1997) conducted a dementia
prevalence study in 649 community-dwelling elders. Head
circumference was measured in a standardized fashion.Analy-
ses controlled for age, education, ethnicity, and height.
Women in the lowest head circumference quintile were 2.9
times more likely to have AD than those in the upper four
quintiles. Similarly, men in the lowest quintile were 2.3
times more likely to have AD. These findings suggest that
individuals with larger brains may have more reserve against
AD pathology.
Even in passive models such as threshold models, it is
clear that there are demographic features that serve as prox-
ies for reserve. These include measures of socioeconomic
status, such as income or occupational attainment. Educa-
tional attainment has also been a widely used proxy for
reserve, probably because it is relatively easy to ascertain.
Finally, specific measured attributes have been used as in-
dices of reserve, including literacy, IQ, and measures of
specific cognitive functions.
Great care must be taken not to confound measures of
reserve with measures of outcome. For example, many stud-
ies have evaluated the relation between IQ or education and
the prevalence or incidence of AD. In these studies, as ex-
plained above, the possibility that education or IQ simply
confounds the diagnosis of AD must be addressed. Kittner
(1986) suggested adjusting for education when screening
for dementia, in order to avoid ascertainment bias. In a
dissenting view, Berkman (1986) suggested that we must
remain open to the view that “educational level and0or socio-
economic behavior correlated with it may be genuine risk
factors for senile dementia and are worthy of scientific ex-
ploration in their own right.” Simply controlling for educa-
tion during assessment will not supply the solution to this
question.
In 1981, Gurland wrote:
It is still an open matter whether there is an important
sociocultural contribution to the prevalence of Alzhei-
mer’s and other forms of dementia occurring in the se-
nium, but the evidence now available is sufficiently
intriguing to warrant further study of the issue.
Similar considerations were raised by other investigators
(Mortimer, 1988). The reason that education or SES might
serve as proxies for reserve is an important issue for re-
search. Lower SES is associated with increased risk for
toxic or environmental exposures, nutritional deficiencies,
or perinatal insult (Katzman, 1993; Mortimer & Graves,
1993). Thus, some studies have noted an association be-
tween education and vascular or alcohol-related dementia
but not AD (Cobb et al., 1995; Del Ser et al., 1997; Fratigli-
oni et al., 1991), suggesting that education may simply be a
proxy for other factors or exposures that mediate risk. Some
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studies have controlled for conditions observable in adults,
such as stroke (Stern et al., 1994) and still found relation-
ships between education and dementia. Still, the potential
interactions between proxies for reserve and clinical out-
comes requires careful investigation. In particular, the im-
portant issue of the effect of perinatal or early childhood
exposures will require prospective studies that follow chil-
dren from before birth.
Education might also be a marker for innate intelligence,
which may in turn be genetically based or a function of
exposures. Some studies suggest that an estimate of IQ, or
premorbid IQ might actually be a more powerful measure
of reserve in some cases (Albert & Teresi, 1999; Alexander
et al., 1997). One study had the unique opportunity to eval-
uate the relation between mental ability, as assessed in 1932
at age 11, and the incidence of dementia (Whalley et al.,
2000). It found that mental ability scores were significantly
lower in children who developed late-onset dementia when
compared to those who remained nondemented.
Still, education, or other life experiences, may impart
reserve over and above that obtained from innate intelli-
gence. Studies have demonstrated separate or synergistic
effects for higher educational and occupational attainment,
suggesting that each of these life experiences contributed
independently to increased reserve (Evans et al., 1993;
Mortel et al., 1995; Rocca et al., 1990; Stern et al., 1994,
1995b). Occupational attainment also served as a measure
of reserve in CBF studies of AD patients (Stern et al., 1995b).
Thus several variables that are descriptive of life experi-
ences might influence the cognitive reserve in the same
way that education does. In addition to occupational attain-
ment, these may include leisure activity (Bickel & Cooper,
2000; Fabrigoule et al., 1995; Hultsch et al., 1999; Kondo
et al., 1994), and literacy (Manly et al., 1999). Also, recent
analyses in our group suggest that, after controlling for ed-
ucational level and measures of intelligence, Spanish-
speaking individuals who learned to speak English have
reduced risk of incident dementia when compared to those
who never learned to speak English. This might suggest
that the experience of acquiring another language imparts
reserve.
ASSUMPTIONS OF BOTH ACTIVE AND
PASSIVE MODELS: CAUTIONS FOR
DESIGNING AND INTERPRETING
RESEARCH
Research investigating reserve tends to treat the three com-
ponents of the reserve model as if they are independent.
This assumption is probably not true. As discussed above,
many of our proxies for reserve are not independent of
the outcome measures. This section reviews other areas of
potential interaction between components of the reserve
model.
A straightforward explication of either the threshold or
cognitive reserve model assumes independence between the
source of brain damage and reserve. For example, when
exploring reserve in AD, it is convenient to begin by assum-
ing that the progression of AD pathology is independent of
the number of neurons a person has or their level of educa-
tion. This simplifying assumption may not be valid, how-
ever. Some investigators (Friedland, 1993; Swaab et al.,
1998) have suggested several mechanisms by which chronic
neuronal activation stemming from educational exposure
or other sources might actually be protective against the
development of AD pathology. Also, the genetic determi-
nants that influence reserve factors such as brain size, in-
telligence, or memory capacity might also influence the
advent of the brain pathology. For example, APOE influ-
ences the timing of the onset of AD, but also has been
related to the rate of change in memory capacity in non-
demented elders (O’Hara et al., 1998). Alternately, one study
found that linguistic ability evidenced in a writing sample
produced at age 22 was predictive of later AD, controlling
for education (Snowdon et al., 1996). This might suggest
that lowered linguistic capacity, even at that early age, was
due to existing pathology.
A related assumption is that the BRC remains relatively
constant. For brain reserve, this simply means that there are
a fixed number of neurons or synapses to lose. For cogni-
tive reserve this means that the brain substrate remains sta-
ble, while the cognitive functions which that substrate
mediates can vary. Again, this simplifying assumption may
not be valid. It has been suggested that education may stim-
ulate increased synaptic growth in the developing infant or
child (Katzman, 1993), similar to that seen in animals reared
in an enriched environment (Diamond, 1988). Increased
dendritic branching has been noted in individuals with more
education (Jacobs et al., 1993), although the causal direc-
tion of this relationship cannot be determined. Recently, it
has been recognized that the adult brain is continuously
generating new, functioning, neurons (Gould et al., 1999).
Further, animal studies suggest that aspects of life experi-
ence, including enriched environment (Kemperman et al.,
1997) and exercise (van Praag et al., 1999) can increase the
amount of new neurons that are generated in mature ani-
mals. Thus some variable ostensibly associated with cogni-
tive reserve, such as education, may dynamically influence
the underlying neural substrate.
DIFFERENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MODELS
The active and passive models of reserve can often lead to
the same predictions, so it is useful to consider the differ-
ential implications of the two types of models. As stated,
the brain reserve, passive, models rely on actual anatomic
differences to determine who has more or less reserve. Thus,
there is no ready explanation in these models for why edu-
cational and occupational attainment, or IQ, should impart
reserve other than to rely on the assumption that these ex-
periences must modify brain anatomy in some way. The
cognitive reserve hypothesis does not rely on gross differ-
ences in brain anatomy.
456 Y. Stern
Some of the research findings described above are more
easily explained using an active reserve model. For exam-
ple, two functional imaging studies described above found
that, in patients matched for overall severity of dementia,
the parietotemporal flow deficit was greater in those with
more years of education. These studies suggest that al-
though pathology was more advanced in patients with higher
education, the clinical manifestations of the disease were
comparable to those in patients with lower education and
less pathology. Given no gross difference in brain size, pas-
sive models do not have a ready explanation for why the
patients with more education can tolerate more pathology.
Some studies described above have also shown that AD
patients with higher educational attainment have more rapid
memory decline and die sooner. There is no ready explana-
tion for this observation using a passive model. In fact, the
explanation put forward above using an active reserve model
relies on the assumption that “brain reserve” does not differ
as a function of education, and essentially posits that there
comes a point when pathology becomes so severe that there
is no longer a substrate for cognitive reserve to come into
play. Thus the active and passive models can produce dif-
ferent predictions and can differ in their ability to explain
observed phenomena.
CONCLUSION
Cognitive reserve is a rich concept that has great heuristic
value for research. While reserve is basically a simple con-
cept, upon consideration there can be many layers of theo-
retical complexity. Consideration of the concept of reserve
suggests that it cannot be considered as a unidimensional
entity. While they overlap to some degree, the concepts of
brain reserve and cognitive reserve may produce different
predictions about the impact of brain pathology on func-
tion. Further, the differentiation of reserve and compensa-
tion may have practical utility particularly when attempting
to study reserve using functional imaging.
Careful thought must go into translating theories about
reserve into a research design. Also, we must resist the urge
to invoke reserve reflexively to explain any anomalous re-
sult. Still, the concept of reserve does have great salience
for the investigation of variability in individual perfor-
mance and for understanding how the brain responds to
challenge and pathology.
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